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AIDS AND FUNERAL HOMES: COMMON
LEGAL ISSUES FACING FUNERAL
DIRECTORS
MARK E. WOJCIK*
INTRODUCTION

Funeral services represent the final stage in the spectrum of
care provided to persons with HIV. Access to funeral services commonly involves such legal issues as discrimination, privacy, and disclosure. These issues are similar to those that arise when a person
with HIV seeks access to health care. For example, the same laws
that guarantee access to medical services also guarantee access to
funeral services. One critical issue affecting access to funeral services is discrimination. Unfortunately, actual practices in the funeral industry do not reflect what anti-discrimination laws require
for the handling of persons who die of illnesses related to HIV. In
fact, many funeral directors and embalmers are oblivious to the potential liabilities they face when they discriminate against a person
who died of an illness related to HIV.
Discrimination against persons with HIV-related illnesses who
seek access to funeral services varies in form. In some cases, discrimination may be blatant, as when a funeral director outright refuses to handle a person who has died of an HIV-related illness.' In
other cases, the discrimination may be subtle, as when an embalmer charges an extra fee to handle a person who died of an HIVrelated illness, and the funeral director passes the additional
* Assistant Professor of Law, The John Marshall Law School. B.A., cum
laude, Bradley University; J.D., with distinction, The John Marshall Law
School; LL.M. (in Trade Regulation), New York University School of Law. The
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1. A claim to lack knowledge or experience in handling HIV cases should
not justify a refusal to handle a person with HIV. Because of the large numbers
of persons infected with HIV, funeral homes must plan for the inevitable case of
handling someone who dies of an illness related to HIV.
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charge on to the family. 2 In either case, these blatant and subtle
forms of discrimination are unlawful and unworthy of the funeral
service profession.
Other common legal issues facing funeral home directors concern issues of disclosure and privacy. Rights to privacy concerning
an individual's HIV status arise in a number of different contexts.
These situations include death certificates, 3 obituaries, 4 and memorial services. 5 Moreover, a discussion of privacy issues also includes the perceived rights of funeral directors to learn from a
6
hospital that a person died of an illness related to HIV.
This essay surveys common legal issues confronting funeral directors and those who utilize their professional services. This essay
seeks to apprise funeral directors and members of the public of
rights and obligations that may arise in seeking access to funeral
services. 7 First, this essay discusses discrimination issues involved
2. Since the embalmer should be using "universal precautions" in all cases
where there is a potential for contact with bodily fluids, there should be no extra equipment necessary for a person who has died of an HIV-related illness, as
compared to a person who dies, for example, of cancer. There should be no
additional fee for additional equipment. Moreover, it is also discriminatory to

charge an extra fee for cleaning a hearse when a person has died of an illness
related to HIV because cleaning should be done in all cases and because the
body, once in the casket, does not come into contact with the hearse.
3. See infra notes 88-95 and accompanying text for a discussion of
problems which arise regarding death certificates.
4. A family may sometimes fear that an obituary will disclose HV or
AIDS as the cause of death and thus stigmatize both the deceased person and
the surviving family members.
5. Disputes among competing family members may create tensions as to
who may learn that a person died of an HV-related illness. Because AIDS has
affected so many non-traditional families, funeral directors will need special
sensitivity in accommodating the needs of both traditional and non-traditional
families. See generally NATIONAL FUNERAL DIRECTORs Assoc., INC., A Caring
Response to an AIDS-Related Death (1991).
6. Many funeral directors view it as a moral obligation on the part of the
hospitals to disclose a biohazard with the use of a red toe tag or other means of
identification. See 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1030(g) (1993). When funeral directors begin to treat all cases as potentially infectious, as they must under the requirement to use universal precautions, there will be less perceived need to know
results of individual cases when persons die of illnesses related to HIV.
7. This essay focuses on issues peculiar to the provision of funeral services,
rather than the full range of legal issues affecting funeral homes. There is already sufficient scholarship to describe general business, insurance, and employment issues related to HV that apply to a broad range of service
businesses, including funeral homes.

For example, a funeral home may have employment law issues related to

the employment of HIV-positive individuals in the funeral home. Although HIV
is covered as a disability under the Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA), the
employment provisions of the ADA apply only to employers with 25 or more
workers until July 26, 1994, when it will apply to employers with 15 or more
workers. Americans With Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5) (1993). For a
discussion of employment issues concerning HIV-positive individuals, see AL.
LAN H. TERL, AIDS AND THE LAw 156 (1992); Laura Pincus, The Americans with
DisabilitiesAct: Employers' New Responsibilities to HIV-Positive Employees, 21
HOFSTRA L. REV. 561 (1993).
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in access to funeral services. Second, this essay discusses issues
involved in privacy rights and duties specific to the funeral industry. This essay concludes with a summary of specific recommendations for funeral home directors.
I.

ACCESS TO FUNERAL SERVICES

Discrimination with regard to access to funeral services arises
in a variety of situations. Both federal and state law provide protection against discrimination to persons with HIV who seek access
to funeral services. This section first discusses the disability laws
that apply to funeral homes. Next, this section recognizes some of
the most common discriminatory practices of funeral homes. In addition, this section discusses issues that arise when traditional and
non-traditional families disagree on funeral arrangements.
A.

Disability and Human Rights Laws Apply to FuneralHomes

Federal law, namely the Americans With Disabilities Act
(ADA)8 and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 9 prohibit
certain forms of discrimination against persons with disabilities or
persons perceived to have disabilities. Section 302 of Title III of the
ADA provides that:
No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability
in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns,
0 leases (or leases to), or operates a
place of public accommodation.'

Because funeral homes provide a service to the public, they are
listed among the private entities considered to be "public accommodations" for purposes of the ADA. 1
Many funeral homes have fewer than 15 workers and would not fall under
the employment provisions of the federal law. They would, however, still fall
under the public accommodation provisions of the ADA. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 12181(7)(F) (1993). In these instances, state and local prohibitions against
discrimination on the basis of a perceived disability would still apply where
those statutes or ordinances exist. See, e.g., ROBERT M. JARVIS ET AL., AIDS
LAW IN A NUTSHELL 57-65 (1991) [hereinafter AIDS LAw]. These local laws may

create an enforcement mechanism that may also facilitate settlement of HIV
discrimination claims. Id. at 64.
8. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1993). The Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L.
No. 102-166 (1991), extended coverage of the ADA to U.S. citizens employed in
foreign countries by U.S. employers. Jay W. Waks, Workers' Rights Now Extend Overseas, NAT'L L.J., Dec. 23, 1991, at 16.
9. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1988). In order to fall under the amended Rehabilitation Act of 1973, the funeral home must receive federal funds. Id.
10. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) (1993).
11. "The following private entities are considered public accommodations
for purposes of this subchapter, if the operations of such entities affect
commerce:
a laundromat, dry-cleaner, bank, barber shop, beauty shop, travel service,
shoe repair service, funeral parlor, gas station, office of an accountant or
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As with all types of public accommodations covered under the
12
ADA, the operations of the funeral home must "affect commerce."
This ADA requirement stems from the Commerce Clause of the
United States Constitution, which purports to limit Congressional
legislative power. 13 The ADA broadly defines the term "commerce"
as "travel, trade, commerce, transportation or communication (A) among the several States; (B) between any foreign country or
any territory or possession and any State; or (C) between points in
14
the same State but through another State or foreign country."
Thus, funeral home directors may rightly wonder whether their operations affect interstate commerce.
Although the question has not specifically arisen under the
ADA, it is essentially settled that activities of funeral homes do affect interstate commerce and would, thus, be covered under the
ADA for at least three reasons. First, funeral homes charge for
services they provide to persons who die in other states and other
countries. Second, funeral industry pricing practices have long
been subject to federal regulation by the Federal Trade Commislawyer, pharmacy, insurance office, professional office of a health care pro-

vider, hospital, or other service establishment; . . ..
42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(F) (1993) (emphasis added). In addition to this explicit
statutory definition, testimony before the U.S. Senate also shows that funeral
homes are places of public accommodation and that the failure to provide services would violate the ADA. Mrs. Betty Corey, a foster parent who cared for a
child with AIDS, testified about her own difficulties in finding funeral services
for the child:
About a week before Kedra died, we decided to begin making arrangements for her funeral and burial. I was a member of the Baltimore County
Task Force on AIDS, and at one of our meetings, the president of the Funeral Directors' Association was there, and I realized at the time we were
going to face a lot of discrimination. We began to make phone calls, and we
were turned down. They either would not take her, or they would not offer
the full services they offered anyone else.
...It took 26 phone calls to 26 different funeral directors before we
finally found one who was willing to take our baby and bury her.
We were given all kinds of stories. They would not embalm her. They
would take her only to the crematorium. It would have to be a closed casket; there would be no viewing. I even had one who told me he would not
accept her because we had her at home, and we would not properly bag her
to protect his employees.
One who was willing to take her wanted an extra $500 because of her
diagnosis and told us if we allowed an autopsy, it would be significantly
higher.
It was horrible. We had fought discrimination while she was alive, and
I did not expect to face that kind of discrimination at death, too.
Americans With DisabilitiesAct of 1989: Hearings on S. 933 Before the Senate
Comm. on Labor and Human Resources and the Subcomm. on the Handicapped, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 102-03 (1989) (statement of Betty and Emory
Corey).
12. 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(F) (1993).
13. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
14. 42 U.S.C. § 12181(1) (1993).
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sion. 15 Third and finally, funeral homes purchase caskets and
other funeral materials from other states and countries. 16 Any one
of these reasons would satisfy the minimal Commerce Clause requirement. Therefore, federal law includes funeral homes under
the ADA.
In addition to the federal law, forty-nine states,' 7 the District
of Columbia, and Puerto Rico' s afford statutory protection for disabled and human rights. These disability and human rights laws
prohibit certain forms of discrimination in areas such as employment,' 9 real estate transactions, 20 financial credit, 2 1 and access to
places of public accommodation. 2 2 Moreover, these laws provide
administrative and judicial remedies for persons who suffer dis23
crimination by places of public accommodation.
Similar in scope to federal law, funeral homes are places of
public accommodation under state disabilities laws. This is true
even though funeral homes may not be expressly listed in the state
statutes. For example, the definition of a "place of public accommodation" in the Illinois Human Rights Act is "a business, accommodation ....
or transportation facility of any kind, whether licensed

or not, whose goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations are extended, offered, sold, or otherwise made available to the public." 24 As illustrations of this definition, the Illinois
25
statute lists "funeral hearses, crematories, [and] cemeteries."
26
However, this list is not meant to be exhaustive.
Funeral homes
are also places of public accommodation because they provide a ser15. 16 C.F.R. § 453 (1993).
16. See, e.g., Granges Metallverken AB v. United States, 716 F. Supp. 17,
20 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1989) (discussing Swedish sales of casket brass in the United
States).
17. Arizona is the only exception among the fifty states. See Kenneth E.
Labowitz, Refusal to Treat HIV-AIDS Patients: What Are the Legal Obligations?, TRIAL 58, 61 n.10 (1992).
18. P.R. LAws ANN. tit. 1, § 505 (Supp. 1988); see also Luis A. Lavin & William B. Rubenstein, The HIV Epidemic in Puerto Rico, in AIDS AGENDA:
EMERGING ISSUES IN CIVIL RIGHTS 203 (Nan D. Hunter & William B. Rubenstein
eds., 1992).
19. See, e.g., Ill. Human Rights Act, 725 ILCS 5/2-101 (1992); Vermont Fair
Employment Practices Act, VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §§ 495-495e (1987 & Supp.
1992); Mancini v. General Elec. Co., 820 F. Supp. 141, 145-48 (D. Vt. 1993).
20. See, e.g., 725 ILCS 5/3-101 (1992). See also 42 U.S.C. § 12901 (1993)
(incentives to devise long-term comprehensive strategies for meeting the housing needs of persons with AIDS and their families).
21. See, e.g., 725 ILCS 5/4-101 (1992).
22. See, e.g., 725 ILCS 5/5-101 (1992); MAss. GEN. L. ch. 272, § 98 (1991).
23. Labowitz, supra note 17, at 59. The ADA does not, preempt these state
and local laws. 42 U.S.C. § 12201(b) (1993); H.R. REP. No. 485, 101st Cong., 2d
Sess. 48, 135 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 418.
24. 725 ILCS 5/5-101(A)(1) (1992).
25. Id. § 5-101(A)(2) (1992) (stating that the list of the different types of
public accommodation is "by way of example, but not limitation").
26. Id.
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vice to the public. 27 Therefore, the services provided by a funeral
28
home should fall under dominion of both federal and state law.
As places of public accommodation, funeral homes may not discriminate on the basis of a disability or perceived disability. 29 It is

undisputed that AIDS, HIV, and the perception that someone has
been infected with HIV are all covered under anti-discrimination
laws. 30 A person who dies of an illness related to HIV is, thus, a
person who dies of an illness related to a perceived disability.
Therefore, a refusal to handle a person who has died of an illness
related to HIV is discrimination against a person with a perceived
disability. The refusal would constitute discrimination even though
a funeral home may argue that someone who has died has no longer
31
a disability after death.
27. See id.; see also Board of Trustees of S. Ill. Univ. v. Department of
Human Rights, 591 N.E.2d 973, 976-77 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992), appealgranted, 602
N.E.2d 447 (Ill. 1992).
28. The definition of a place of public accommodation for purposes of disability laws may be controversial in selected jurisdictions where other civil rights
laws provide relatively less protection for discrimination in places of public accommodation. Improved drafting of recent statutes and ordinances, however,
generally obviates disagreement as to the nature of public accommodations covered. See, e.g., Board of Trustees of S. Ill. Univ., 591 N.E.2d at 979-81 (Welch,
J., dissenting); Human Rights Comm'n of N.M. v. Board of Regents, 624 P.2d
518, 518-20 (N.M. 1981); Labowitz, supra note 17, at 59 (noting that the ADA's
definition of "public accommodation" extends "far beyond the scope of traditional civil rights laws").
29. Remedies for discrimination include court actions and administrative
proceedings, including the possible awards of attorneys' fees, litigation expenses and the costs of trial. H.R. REP. No. 485(11), 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 140
(1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 423. Where there is an issue of
general public importance in discrimination issues arising in entities such as
funeral homes, the Attorney General of the United States may also initiate civil
actions to collect penalties of up to $50,000 for a first violation and $100,000 for
any subsequent violation. 42 U.S.C. § 12188(b). The legislative history encourages active enforcement by the Attorney General. H.R. REP. No. 485(111), 101st
Cong., 2d Sess. 67 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445, 490.
30. See, e.g., Doe v. Attorney Gen., 941 F.2d 780, 797 (9th Cir. 1991) (finding doctor with AIDS "handicapped" under section 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act); Severino v. North Fort Myers Fire Control Dist., 935 F.2d 1179, 1182 n.4
(1 1th Cir. 1991) (finding fire fighter with HIV "handicapped" under section 504
of Rehabilitation Act); Glanz v. Vernick, 756 F. Supp. 632, 634 (D. Mass. 1991)
(finding patient with HIV was "handicapped" under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act); Cain v. Hyatt, 734 F. Supp. 671, 678 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (finding attorney with HIV "handicapped" under Pennsylvania Human Rights Act); Leckelt
v. Board of Comm'rs of Hosp. Dist. No. 1, 714 F. Supp. 1377, 1385 n.4 (E.D. La.
1989), aff'd, 909 F.2d 820 (5th Cir. 1990); H.R. RPx. No. 485(11), 101st Cong., 2d
Sess. 48, 51-52 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 330, 333-34; H.R.
REP No. 485(111), 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 28, 39 (1990), reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 445, 451, 461.
31. The logic of this statement may be easier to understand in other contexts. For example, a woman who dies is still a woman; her estate could pursue
any claims of gender discrimination. An African-American who dies is still an
African-American; an estate could pursue any claims of discrimination based on
race. A Jewish man who dies is still a Jewish man; his estate could pursue any
claims of discrimination based on religious belief. A blind woman who dies has
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The view that funeral homes are places of public accommodation that are prohibited from discriminating against persons with
HIV under disability and human rights laws was confirmed in
DiMiceli & Sons Funeral Home v. New York City Commission on
Human Rights.3 2 The Human Rights Commission issued a complaint against a funeral home that not only charged inflated fees
when persons died of causes related to AIDS, but also insisted that
family members purchase costly extras such as glass-sealed caskets.3 3 The funeral home argued that discrimination against the
"physically handicapped" did not extend to those who have died of
causes related to HIV. 3 4 The funeral home also argued that funeral

homes were not places of public accommodation under the human
rights code.35
The DiMiceli court rejected both arguments. The court found
that the term "physically handicapped" extended "to those individuals who have died due to complications associated with the AIDS
virus and to their family members who have been stigmatized by
their association with the deceased."3 6 The court also found that
not lost her disability; her estate could pursue any claims of discrimination
based on that handicap. A woman with HIV who dies likewise has not lost her
perceived disability; her estate could pursue any claims of discrimination based
on that perceived disability.
32. 1987 WL 19527/86 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 9. 1987), reprintedin MICHAEL L.
CLOSEN ET AL., AIDS: CASES & MATERIALS 490-93 (Supp. 1992) (hereinafter
AIDS CASEBOOK) and N.Y.L.J., Jan. 14, 1987, at 12.

33. AIDS

CASEBOOK,

supra note 32, at 491.

34. Id. at 491-92.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 492. The court reasoned that:
The phrase "substantially limits one or more major life activities" serves
only to define "physical or mental impairment" and does not imply that
statutory protection is afforded only to those who are discriminated against
while alive. There is adequate precedent for affording the individual dignity and freedom from discrimination not only in those activities and services performed during one's life, but also in those activities and services
performed at one's death. The moral precepts and public policy that dictates the elimination of discrimination based solely upon one's color, creed,
race, nationality or handicap, are not extinguished with the end of a life,
but continue through the final services administered in death. There is
statutory precedent for extending protection from discriminatory practices
by facilities that provide services for the dead. Additionally, the party aggrieved in the situation is the family or life partner of the individual who
has died from AIDS. It is the remaining life partner or family members
who suffer discrimination. Traditionally, family members have received
compensation where they have sued for the negligent handling of a body.
The legal theory incorporated is based upon the family's quasi-property
right in the body. The Court of Appeals has advised that "such a property
right is little more than a fiction, in reality the personal feelings of the
survivors are being protected." Thus, the courts have extended legal protections to remaining family members when improper services are rendered to the deceased. Different treatment should not be afforded family
members where discrimination is extended from the victim of the disease to
family members who are already suffering from the loss of a loved one.
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the human rights laws covered funeral homes as places of public
accommodation. The court noted that the human rights code did
37
not expressly cover or exclude funeral homes from coverage.
Moreover, the DiMiceli court followed the reasoning of the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania in which it held that nonsectarian cemeteries were places of public accommodation under the Pennsylvania
Human Relations Act. That court reasoned that the "[P]ublic need
for the services made available by cemeteries is irrefutably all inclusive - all of us, at one time or another, will be entrusted unto
their care. All of those factors bring cemeteries squarely into the
public domain and give them a special status."38 Following this
reasoning, the DiMiceli court held the basic premise of "special status" to be "equally applicable to funeral homes because of the similarity in the care and services provided." 39 Thus, the court
held
40
that funeral homes were places of public accommodation.
Although federal and state law provide anti-discrimination protection for HIV individuals who seek access to funeral homes, the
actual filing of a discrimination claim against funeral homes may
prove more complicated because of problems relating to standing.
The deceased individuals themselves are unable to bring discrimination claims. Furthermore, the representatives of the estate are
often too emotionally distraught to pursue litigation or administrative remedies 4 1 that would challenge discriminatory practices so
wide spread that they appear to define industry practice. As a result, many acts of discrimination have gone unchallenged.
B.

Forms of Discrimination

Funeral homes discriminate against persons with HIV in many
ways. The most common discriminatory practices of funeral homes
37. Id. at 493.
38. Pennsylvania Human Relations Comm'n v. Alto-Reste Park Cemetery
Ass'n, 306 A.2d 881, 886-87 (Pa. 1973).
39. DiMiceli & Sons Funeral Home v. New York City Comm'n on Human
Rights, 1987 WL 19527/86 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 9, 1987), reprinted in AIDS
CASEBOOK, supra note 32, at 490, 493. The court could additionally have found
that funeral homes are places of public accommodation because funeral homes
are specifically empowered by state statutes to provide funeral services to the
public. Persons who die of illness related to HIV are thus entitled to be protected from discrimination in funeral services. This protection extends to the
provision of or securing of the life partners and families of those who die of
illnesses related to HIV.
40. Id.; see also Sattler v. City of N.Y. Comm'n on Human Rights, 554
N.Y.S.2d 763, 767 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1990), affd, 580 N.Y.S.2d 35 (N.Y. App. Div.),
appeal denied, 610 N.E.2d 388 (N.Y. 1992); Hurwitz v. New York City Comm'n
on Human Rights, 535 N.Y.S.2d 1007, 1013 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1988), afl'd, 553
N.Y.S.2d 323 (N.Y. App. Div.), appeal denied, 557 N.E.2d 1187 (N.Y. 1990).
41. In Chicago, for example, administrative remedies may be available from
the Chicago Commission on Human Relations, the Cook County Commission on
Human Rights, and the Illinois Department of Human Rights.
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include refusals to handle the body, overcharging, and improper demands. The most blatant form of discrimination occurs when a funeral home simply refuses to provide services to a person who has
died of an illness related to HIV. A refusal to provide services to a
person who dies of an illness related to HIV likely arises from the
"unwarranted fear of transmission of AIDS or from a concern that
other customers will be disinclined to use the services of a funeral
42
home that caters to people with AIDS."
Other forms of discrimination against persons who die of HIVAIDS may be more subtle, such as overcharging. Some funeral
43
homes have insisted on costly extras such as glass-sealed caskets.
Additionally, many funeral homes hire embalmers for only those
cases where they know (or suspect) that a person has died of an
illness related to HIV. 4 4 Similarly, the embalmer may charge an
extra fee for handling the person, and the funeral director would
then pass on the extra fee as part of the total bill for the funeral
service. 4 5 Moreover, the funeral home itself may attempt to charge
extra for alleged extra services or extra precautions. 46 However,
additional charges to handle cases where a person died of causes
47
related to HIV violate anti-discrimination laws.
Likewise, funeral directors should not charge special fees, such
as one to clean out hearses after the funeral of a person who died of
an illness related to HIV. This additional charge is discriminatory
because it is levied only in the case where a person died of causes
related to HIV. The body is not exposed to the hearse; thus it
42. AIDS LAw, supra note 7, at 127.
43. DiMiceli & Sons Funeral-Home v. N. Y. City Comm'n on Human Rights,
1987 WL 19527/86 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 9, 1987), reprinted in AIDS CASEBOOK,
supra note 32, at 490, 491; Mark Barnes, Discrimination in Places of Public
Accommodation:Access to Health Care,Education,and Other Services, in AIDS
PRACTICE MANUAL: A LEGAL AND EDUCATIONAL GUIDE § 11.4, at 11-16 (Paul Al-

bert et al. eds., 3d ed. 1992).
44. See, e.g., Funeral Services by Gregory, Inc. v. Bluefield Community
Hosp. 413 S.E.2d 79, 81 (W. Va. 1991), overruled on other grounds, Courtney v.
Courtney 437 S.E.2d 436 (W. Va. 1993). ("If the family had insisted on embalming, Gregory [claims he] would have taken additional steps to minimize his exposure, such as [by] . . . sending the body to an embalming service").
45. See 16 C.F.R. §§ 453.2(b)(4)(ii)(F),(G) (1993) (requiring disclosure on
price lists for "embalming" and "other preparation of the body"); see also id.

§ 453.3(a)(2) (requiring preventive measures against misrepresentations in embalming practices).
46. DiMiceli & Sons Funeral Home v. New York City Comm'n on Human
Rights, 1987 WL 19527/86 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 9, 1987), reprinted in AIDS
CASEBOOK, supra note 32, at 490-91; Barnes, supra note 43, at 11-16.
47. But see-Doe v. Kahala Dental Group, 808 P.2d 1276 (Haw. 1991). The
Doe case found no violation of the Hawaii anti-discrimination law because additional precautions would be needed to treat a dental patient with HIV. The
case "ignored the CDC guidelines on universal precautions and is not in line
with current medical opinion." Kathleen M. Flaherty, Insurancefor People with
AIDS Remains Problematic Despite ADA, 21 J.L. MED. & ETHIcs 397, 397
(1993).
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makes no difference if the person died of simple pneumonia or a
pneumonia related to HIV. 48 Another way funeral homes discrimi-

nate against persons who die of HIV is when they make improper
demands or wrongly suggest to families that persons with HIV
must be cremated or buried in a closed casket in order to avoid
49
embalming.
Regardless of form, these acts constitute discrimination for
which the funeral home may be liable under disability and human
rights laws. Each of these acts constitutes discrimination against a
person who has died of an illness related to HIV, and against their
surviving life partners and families, because in each instance the
treatment is significantly different from that afforded to individuals
who die of other causes.
Additionally, these acts of discrimination are based on the
knowledge (or suspicion) that someone had AIDS. Funeral workers
wrongly assume that it is possible to identify visually the bodies of
those who die of causes related to HIV. As a result, funeral workers
may thus make inappropriate decisions about when it is necessary
to use universal precautions.
Funeral workers who assume that it is not necessary to wear
protective clothing in all instances do so at their peril where there
is potential exposure to bodily fluids. First, privacy considerations
may lead to secrecy about the cause of death. Second, stereotypes
about persons who die of causes related to HIV are usually false.
Priests, for example, have died of causes related to HIV. Married
men have died of causes related to HIV, often without the previous
knowledge of their spouses. A woman of eighty years who is raped
by an HIV-positive employee of the nursing home may well carry
the virus.
In each of these examples, unfounded assumptions that a person did not have HIV would place funeral workers in danger unless
those workers were using the protective gear recommended for the
universal precautions for the funeral industry. 50 Furthermore, use
48. Pneumocystis carinii pneumonia (PCP) was a common cause of death in

the early years of the first decade of AIDS. Aerosolized pentamidine and other
medications have reduced (but not eliminated) the incidence of PCP as a cause
of death related to HIV.
49. See, e.g., Funeral Services by Gregory, Inc. v. Bluefield Community
Hosp., 413 S.E.2d 79, 81 (W. Va. 1991) (finding that the statute of limitations
for certain claims raised in the Gregory case should be two years rather than
one year); Jury Awards [Pennsylvania]Woman $175,000 On Empty Casket Funeral Charges, AIDS POL'Y & LAw, Jan. 21, 1994, at 3; see also Americans With

DisabilitiesAct of 1989: Hearings on S. 933 Before the Senate Comm. on Labor
and Human Resources and the Subcomm. on the Handicapped,101st Cong., 1st

Sess. 102-03 (1989) (statement of Betty and Emory Corey).
50. Centers for Disease Control, Recommendations for the Prevention of
HIV Transmission in Health-CareSettings, 36 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY.
REP. (Supp. 2) 3S (Aug. 21, 1987), reprinted in AIDS CASEBOOK, supra note 32,
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of the universal precautions will protect workers (and independent
contractor embalmers) from other dangers, such as hepatitis.
Given the embalming and body preparation services afforded to all
persons, one should assume the potential exists for contact with
bio-hazardous materials where there is contact with bodily fluids. 5 1
The use of special protective clothing in only "suspicious" cases
would be unjustifiable and discriminatory. The practice would also
violate the regulations of the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA).5 2 Because the protective clothing mandated
by the universal precautions should be universal, additional

charges for special protective clothing in suspicious (or even known)
53
cases would likewise be unjustifiable and discriminatory.

at 490. "In addition to the universal blood and body-fluid precautions listed
above, the following precautions should be used by persons performing postmortem procedures:
[a] All persons performing or assisting in postmortem procedures should
wear gloves, masks, protective eyewear, gowns, and waterproof
aprons.
[b] Instruments and surfaces contaminated during postmortem procedures should be decontaminated with appropriate chemical
germicide."
Id.; see also Centers for Disease Control, Guidelines for Prevention of Transmission of Human Immunodeficiency Virus and Hepatitis B Virus to HealthCare and Public Safety Workers, 38 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 86
(1989); Centers for Disease Control, Update: Universal Precautionsfor Prevention of Transmission of Human Immunodeficiency Virus, HepatitisB Virus, and
Other Bloodborne Pathogens in Health Care Settings, 37 MORBIDITY & MORTAL.
rrY WKLY REP. 377, 377-82, 387-88 (1988); Centers for Disease Control, Recommendations for Preventing Transmissionwith HTL V-III/LA V in the Workplace,
34 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 681 (1985).
51. See, e.g., Matthew J. Bankowski et al., Postmortem Recovery of Human
Immunodeficiency Virus Type 1 from Plasma and Mononuclear Cells; 116
ARCHIVES OF PATHOLOGY & LABORATORY MED. 1124, 1127 (1192). Dr. Bankowski and his colleagues concluded that HIV can remain viable in postmortem
blood for up to 21.25 hours after death. Because the study did not address the
more important issue of HIV survival in postmortem tissues, embalmers should
use universal precautions before and after that period of 21.25 hours. None of
the conclusions in the study would support a refusal to handle a person who
died of an illness related to HIV. Because universal precautions must always
be worn, there is also no justification to delay embalming. When a hairdresser
or cosmetologist does final preparations to a body before an open casket viewing, there would be no contact with the bodily fluids.
52. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1030 (1993).
53. Professor Mark Barnes has observed that:
[F]uneral homes may charge more to handle the remains of a person identified as HIV-infected, or may require that the family of an HIV-infected deceased person purchase additional services, such as the use of glass
screens, that are allegedly necessary for infection control. Such procedures
and extra charges are unnecessary, since all funeral homes and embalmers
should, like health care workers, be using universal barrier precautions in
dealing with all human remains. Many state and local health departments
have also issued universal barrier precaution recommendations for morticians and embalmers, and the attorney should obtain any such formal
memoranda or recommendations for use as evidence of applicable standards of care.
Barnes, supra note 43, at 11-16.
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In all of these cases of additional charges for persons who die of
causes related to HIV, attorneys should recall that funeral directors
and embalmers "are usually licensed by a state authority, and complaints of inflated prices or of denials of service based on HIV infection should be reported to the proper [state] authorities."5 4 Reports
may also be made to the Federal Trade Commission when a funeral
provider represents that "Federal, State, or local laws, or particular
cemeteries or crematories, require the purchase of any funeral
goods or funeral services when such is not the case."5 5 A lawsuit
may also be brought for a deceptive act or practice that violates federal or state law. 5 6 There may also be state statutes that prohibit

any additional charges to embalm persons who die of causes related
to HIV or AIDS. 5 7 This includes additional charges for blood and
58
body fluid precautions.
Furthermore, in developing discrimination cases for persons
who died of causes related to HIV, evidence may also suggest discrimination against the survivors of the person who died of an illness related to HIV. The funeral service director may perceive
(correctly or not) that the surviving spouse or life partner also has
HIV. The funeral service director may fear that persons with HIV
may attend the memorial service. A refusal to handle a case because of fears of an HIV-seropositive spouse, life partner, or friends
would constitute unlawful discrimination on the basis of a perceived disability. Each of these persons would have individual
claims of discrimination (or, alternatively, a small class action) beyond any claim that may be brought on behalf of the estate.
C. Who Has the Right to Make FuneralArrangements?
Given the number of persons dying from causes related to HIV,
funeral home directors may sometimes face the unenviable task of
mediating difficult and emotional confrontations that surface only
after a person has died. For example, traditional and non-traditional family members may suppress confrontations that will surface only after a death. The traditional family may want a religious
ceremony with family members only. The life partner in a nontraditional family, on the other hand, may want a service that is
54. Barnes, supra note 43, at 11-17. In Illinois, for example, a complaint

can be made to the Illinois Department of Professional Regulation.
55. 16 C.F.R. § 453.3(d)(1) (1993).
56. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 576 (1988); 815 ILCS 505/2 (1992).
57. "No embalmer or funeral director shall charge more for embalming the
remains of a person with a communicable disease which requires blood and
body fluid precautions than the price for embalming services listed on the price
list funeral providers are required to maintain and provide to consumers pursuant to 16 C.F.R. § 453.2 (1988)." Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 213.076(8) (Michie/
Bobbs-Merrill 1991).
58. Id.
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non-religious and includes lovers and friends (perhaps even excluding family who neglected the deceased because of objections to a
"chosen lifestyle").5 9 It has been observed that:
A surprising number of disputes can arise in connection with the arrangements and conduct of a funeral after the death of someone with
AIDS. These problems can include a wide range of matters. What
funeral home should be retained to conduct the services? Will the decedent be cremated or buried in the more usual fashion? Who will be
allowed to attend the funeral services? How will the services be paid
for?
Especially where a non-traditional relationship is involved, the funeral may be the time that is ripe for a major confrontation with the
blood family. The natural family may wish to exclude the non-traditional partner or vice versa. The wishes of the decedent may not be
honored, especially if they have not been written down or otherwise
recorded. Because time is short, there are serious practical difficulties
in attempting to resolve a dispute by means of protracted legal proceedings. It therefore is important for the decedent either to have left
clear instructions with regard to such matters as the conduct of the
funeral or to have made a clear designation regarding who has the authority to make decisions about funeral arrangements. Where funeral
arrangements have been made with a particular funeral home and
have been pre-paid, there may be some reluctance on the 60
part of both
traditional and non-traditional family members to object.
In making funeral arrangements for persons who die of illnesses related to HIV, funeral directors should anticipate potential
conflicts that may arise in making the arrangements and in who
has the right to make decisions about the arrangements. There is
often no clear answer as to who has the right to make funeral arrangements, because there is no agreement as to who owns a body
59. As an additional example, where both members of a gay couple have
HIV, they may decide to be cremated after their deaths, so that their ashes can
be commingled and spread over a favorite area. The traditional family may
want a traditional burial for one of the partners, however. Disputes of this
nature are often difficult to resolve. Funeral directors, however, are regularly
called upon as mediators.
60. AIDS LAW, supra note 7, at 126-27. Professor Rhonda R. Rivera offers
additional observations on the benefits of written funeral arrangements and
pre-paid funeral plans for persons with HIV:
I suggest that the PWA [person with AIDS] write detailed directions about
his wishes and distribute them to his attorney-in-fact, his executor, and his
family. For some biological families, an expression of wishes is sufficient.
However, if the PWA truly believes that his biological family will ignore his
wishes, I suggest that he purchase in advance a funeral plan with a reputable mortuary. His doctor and the hospital should be informed of his plans.
Quite often upon death, the hospital personnel will notify the funeral home
immediately, and the funeral home will then collect the body and proceed
with the plans as directed before counter orders arise. To be blunt, I have
found that families who wish to impose their wishes as to funeral arrangements are often unwilling to overturn prepaid plans and thus become financially liable for new plans. In other words, the biological family is
presented with a fait accompli.
Rhonda R. Rivera, Lawyers, Clients and AIDS: Some Notes From the Trenches,
49 OHIO ST. L.J. 883, 901 (1989).
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after death, or indeed whether the body may be owned. Cases have
held that the wishes of the deceased person as to the disposition of
the body are entirely ineffective, 6 1 or entirely effective, 6 2 or simply
evidence to be used to balance "the interests of the public, the
wishes of the decedent, and the rights and feelings of those entitled
63
to be heard by reason of relationship or association."
In some states, the durable power of attorney for health care
will survive the principal's death and empower the named agent to
make necessary funeral arrangements, unless specifically excluded
from doing so in the document.6 4 The named agent may thus have
the legal right to make funeral arrangements in jurisdictions where
the health care power of attorney survives the death. In a dispute
with estranged family members, the named agent would have the
right to decide upon the disposition of the body.6 5 This is only true,
however, in jurisdictions where the health care power of attorney
survives the death of the principal. In many jurisdictions the durable powers of attorney - for both health care and for property 66
cease at the time of death.
61. See Enos v. Snyder, 63 P. 170, 171 (Cal. 1900) (holding that a person
has no property right in his own corpse such that he could dispose of it by will).
62. See Wood v. E.R. Butterworth & Sons, 118 P. 212, 214 (Wash. 1911)
(holding that the wishes of the deceased should be respected if they can be
ascertained).

63. Pettigrew v. Pettigrew, 56 A. 878, 880 (Pa. 1904). "How far the desires
of the decedent should prevail against those of a surviving husband or wife is an
open question, but as against remoter connections, such wishes, especially if
strongly and recently expressed, should usually prevail." Id.; see also AIDS
CASEBOOK, supra note 32, at 486 (surmising that a "life partner is a 'remoter
connection'").
64. See, e.g., Illinois Durable Power of Attorney, 755 ILCS 45/2-1 (1992).
65. The members of the traditional family may, however, have the money
needed for appropriate burial services. Funeral home directors are often called
upon to mediate disputes in these circumstances where a person with the legal
right to make the arrangements lacks the money to do so. Compromises are
common, yet funeral home directors are seldom trained to mediate these disputes effectively.
66. See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-3410 (1992) (providing that the health
care power of an attorney expires at death). A funeral director in Silver Spring,
Maryland, observed that:
A lot of people don't realize their durable powers of attorney cease at time
of death, says Paul Lee. A lot of attorneys don't know that. And technically, that means the lover can't sign a required authorization to cremate.
Only the next of kin is authorized to sign it. And a lot of times, as soon as
someone dies, you'll see a complete 180-degree turn in some family attitudes. That happens quite a bit.
That 'turn' in the family's attitude, he explains, is often a hostile one,
against the surviving lover. Even if there is no family, there can be additional problems for Gays.
If there's no next of kin, says Lee, the medical examiner won't let us pick up
the body for as much as 30 days. That, of course, delays any ceremonies for
burial or cremation and prolongs the grieving of the lost person's lover and
friends.
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II.

PRIVACY RIGHTS AND DUTIES

Privacy in the context of a funeral raises unique questions of
the right to know when a person has died of an illness related to
HIV. Sadly, years of governmental neglect and denial of AIDS produced a society that does not always understand how HIV is transmitted. Euphemistic, if not cryptic, slogans purported to educate
the public about the dangers of "body fluids." This term was considered to be preferable to the words "blood, semen, vaginal fluids, and
breast milk." Unfortunately, the term "body fluids" left many unsure as to whether HIV could be transmitted by tears, saliva, or
sweat. Harmful discrimination eventually resulted from the public
debate over the scope of the term "body fluids."
Embalmers, for example, come into contact with all of the person's body fluids. Embalmers would thus claim a specific right (if
not a need) to know if those fluids carried HIV. In addition, embalmers would claim a specific obligation for a hospital to inform
the funeral director directly of the deceased's HIV status (by telephone or in person when a body is collected from the hospital) or to
identify HIV or AIDS as a cause of death on the death certificate, or
by the use of red toe tags. 6 7 This duty to warn may also arise by
statute, though the failure to warn that a person died of causes related to HIV would not excuse the failure to use the recommended
universal precautions. Privacy issues may also arise for funeral directors in connection with death certificates, death notices, and
68
rental caskets.
A. Can FuneralHome Directors Sue Hospitals That Do Not
Disclose That a Person Died of an Illness Related to HIV?
Funeral directors expect hospitals to inform them when a person has died of an illness related to HIV. 6 9 Some states require

explicit notice to funeral directors and embalmers that an individual has died of a "contagious disease." 70 The legislatures intended
that this notice would enable funeral home workers and embalmers
to protect themselves in dangerous situations. Providing only speAIDS CASEBOOK, supra note 32, at 70-71 (Supp. 1992) (summary of Lisa M.
Keen, Preparingfor the Final Goodbye, WASHINGTON BLADE, Apr. 10, 1992, at
1).
67. See 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1030(g) (1993) (Bloodborne pathogen rule).
68. Specifically, privacy questions may arise as to whether a funeral home
must disclose the cause of death to subsequent families arranging cremation
services involving a rental casket.
69. See 29 C.F.R. §§ 1910.1030(b),(g) (1993) (Bloodborne pathogen rule).
70. See, e.g., Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 213.076(8) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1991);
Mandatory Identification of Infected Corpses § 1099.1, 1988 La. Acts 1070 (Act
No. 668), reprinted in AIDS CASEBOOK, supra note 32, at 494-95; AIDS LAw,
supra note 7, at 276-77 (discussing state requirements for reporting deaths).
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cial notice, however, may encourage a pattern where protective

clothing will be worn only in these special situations.
The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 71 does not recommend tagging bodies of HIV-infected persons to enable special
precautions with such a body, but instead recommends that morticians and others handling bodies follow universal precautions to
protect against infection. 7 2 The Kentucky statute, for example, also
provides that the failure to warn "shall not relieve any embalmer or
funeral director from taking universal blood and body fluid precautions as are recommended by the United States Department of
Health and Human Services, Centers for Disease Control for Morti73
cians' Services."
Funeral directors have sued hospitals for failing to fulfill the
perceived duty to warn when a person has died of an illness related
to HIV. 74 Many of these suits have not been successful because
there has been no instance of HIV transmission brought about by
the failure to inform. Some courts have held that the fear of contracting HIV is insufficient to justify recovery for funeral directors
who believe they are exposed to HIV. 75 This result is similar to
71. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention was previously entitled
the Centers for Disease Control. Professor Philipson and Judge Posner correctly note that the new name is redundant and unfamiliar. THOMAS J. PHILIPSON & RICHARD A. POSNER, PRIVATE CHOICES AND PUBLIC HEALTH: THE AIDS
EPIDEMIC IN AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 11 n.8 (1993).
72. AIDS LAw, supra note 7, at 276-77. "Universal precautions" is "an approach to infection control" that requires persons to treat all blood and certain
body fluids "as if known to be infectious for HIV, HBV and other bloodborne
pathogens." 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1030(b) (1993).
73. Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 213.076(8) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1991).
74. One suit was even instituted for failing to notify the funeral home when
the hospital learned that an HIV-antibody test was negative. Gilkes v. Warren
Gen. Hosp., No. 93-T-4828, 1993 WL 407305 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 30, 1993).
The suit was dismissed. Even a negative antibody test result would not necessarily indicate that a body did not carry HIV antigen; the person could have
been in the beginning stage, before antibodies developed, or in the end stage,
when antibodies no longer appear. Because the person died, the end stage of
AIDS is a more likely hypothesis.
75. Funeral Services by Gregory, Inc. v. Bluefield Community Hosp., 413
S.E.2d 79, 81-84 (W. Va. 1991), overruled on other grounds, Courtney v.
Courtney, 437 S.E.2d 436 (W. Va. 1993) (statute of limitations for intentional
infliction of emotional distress should have been two years rather than one
year); accord Burk v. Sage Prods. Inc., 747 F. Supp. 285, 286-88 (E.D. Pa. 1990)
(recovery denied for needle stick); Neal v. Neal, No. 19086, 1993 WL 228394
(Idaho Ct. App. June 29, 1993) (no recovery for a wife who claimed she would
not have had sex with her husband had she known that her husband was having intercourse with another woman); Ordway v. County of Suffolk, 583
N.Y.S.2d 1014 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1992) (surgeon could not sue patient who did not
disclose HIV); Petri v. Bank of N.Y., 582 N.Y.S.2d 608 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1992) (no
recovery. against a sexual partner who did not disclose HIV status because
plaintiff did not test positive for HIV); Doe v. Doe, 519 N.Y.S.2d 595 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1987) (recovery denied to wife whose husband failed to disclose that he had
homosexual relations); Hare v. State, 539 N.Y.S.2d 1018 (N.Y. Ct. Cl. 1989) (no
recovery for X-ray technician bitten by inmate); Carroll v. Sisters of St. Francis
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cases that have denied recovery for fear of developing cancer 76 or a
disease related to asbestos exposure where the plaintiff has not
manifested any signs of illness. 7 7 The result may also be compared
to cases that deny recovery for mental injuries, except where some
someone sees a
trauma accompanies the mental illness or where
78
close relative injured by another's negligence.
Yet courts have also found that an individual's fear of contracting HIV may sometimes justify recovery, even without proof of
HIV transmission. 79 A flurry of litigation in this area means that
the likelihood of recovery for funeral directors may be an open proposition. Much of the debate, however, appears to be ill-informed as
to how HIV is actually transmitted.8 0
When these suits arise in funeral homes, courts should note
that the use of protective clothing and other universal precautions
to prevent HIV transmission is now mandatory for workers in funeral homes where there is a potential for exposure to any body
fluid, without regard to whether there are specific concerns only
Health Servs., Inc., 868 S.W.2d 585 (Tenn. 1993) (reversing appellate court
case, which other courts have relied on, to find that a hospital visitor could not
recover for fear of contracting AIDS from a needle stick). See also Poole v. Alpha Therapeutic Corp., 698 F. Supp. 1367 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (requiring that the
plaintiff must prove that he or she has tested positive for HIV antibody); Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Doe, 840 P.2d 288 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992). Both Poole and
Transamerica have been criticized as imposing too great a burden of proof.
Carroll, 868 S.W.2d at 591.
76. See, e.g., Hagerty v. L & L Marine Servs., Inc., 788 F.2d 315 (5th Cir.
1986); Coffin v. Board of Supervisors, 620 So. 2d 1354, 1363 (La. Ct. App. 1993);
Vallery v. Southern Baptist Hosp., 630 So. 2d 861 (La. Ct. App. 1993) (Ward, J.,
dissenting).
77. See, e.g., Mark E. Wojcik, Tracing the Fibers of Asbestos Litigation:
When Do an Insurer's Duties of Defense and Indemnity Arise?, 36 FED'N INS. &
CORP. CouNs. Q. 283 (1986); Lori J. Khan, Comment, Untangling the Insurance
Fibersin Asbestos Litigation:Toward a NationalSolution to the Asbestos Injury
Crisis, 68 TULANE L. REV. 195, 207 (1993).

78. Vallery v. Southern Baptist Hosp., 630 So. 2d 861 (Ward, J., dissenting).
79. Marchica v. Long Island R.R., 810 F. Supp. 445 (E.D.N.Y. 1993); Marriott v. Sedco Forex Int'l Resources, Ltd., 827 F. Supp. 59 (D. Mass. 1993) (allowing cause of action under Jones Act and general maritime law for
inoculation with vaccine contaminated with HIV); Kerins v. Hartley, 21 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 621 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993) (patient could sue surgeon who did not disclose seropositive status), review granted, 860 P.2d 1182 (Cal. 1993); Faya v.
Almaraz, 620 A.2d 327 (Md. App. Ct. 1993) (patients could sue seropositive surgeon for not disclosing that he had AIDS); Castro v. New York Life Ins. Co., 588
N.Y.S.2d 695 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1991) (needle stick); Johnson v. West Virginia
Univ. Hosps., 413 S.E.2d 889 (W. Va. 1991) (allowing cause of action for a security guard bitten by patient with HIV).
80. Additionally, much of the debate may stem from recent (and unfortunate) trends to create special laws that effectively criminalize persons with
HIV. See Illinois v. Russell, Nos. 73721 & 74443, 1994 WL 12502 (Ill. Jan. 20,
1994) (reversing findings that the Illinois HIV exposure statute was unconstitutionally vague). But see THOMAS J. PHILIPSON & RICHARD A. POSNER, PRIVATE
CHOICES AND PUBLIC HEALTH: THE AIDS EPIDEMIC IN AN ECONOMIC PERSPEC-

TIVE (1993) (supporting criminalization).
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about HIV.8 1 In practice, however, funeral home workers may not
wear cumbersome or uncomfortable protective clothing, even during embalming procedures. The failure to wear protective clothing
in these extreme procedures may bar recovery for breach of any perceived duty to inform.
When the hospital does not inform the funeral home that a person died of an illness related to HIV, the funeral home should not
assume that the person does not have HIV or that the use of
mandatory protective clothing is unwarranted. The hospital may
itself not know that the person had HIV. The person may have
been only recently infected and may not yet have developed antibodies against the virus.8 2 Funeral home workers should always use
the universal precautions recommended for procedures involving
any potential exposure to HIV (or another bloodborne pathogen).
The only reported court decision to date has found that a hospital was not liable to a funeral home for failing to disclose that a
person died of an HIV-related illness.8 3 The decision considered
only a claim of battery, however, because the court found that the
statute of limitations had expired on other claims for negligent and
intentional infliction of emotional distress and for negligent and intentional misrepresentation. Because there was no liability for battery,8 4 and because no other claims were pending or available,
there was no liability for failing to disclose that a person had AIDS.
Although this particular claim was unsuccessful, it will not preclude timely claims against hospitals for failing to disclose that a
85
person died of an illness related to HIV.
Even in cases of active concealment of HIV, other court cases
have found that there should be no recovery for individuals who do
not themselves contract HIV. In J.B. v. Bohonovsky,8 6 the court
81. See 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1030(d) (1993).
82. In this "window period," a person may carry the virus (antigen) for a
time before the body will develop HIV antibodies. Current HIV testing is for
antibodies, not the virus itself, although it is possible to test directly for the
virus with a p24 antigen test. Individuals infected with HIV will usually develop antibodies within six months. See, e.g., Burk v. Sage Prods., Inc., 747 F.
Supp. 285, 288 (E.D. Pa. 1990).

83. Funeral Services by Gregory v. Bluefield Community Hosp., 413 S.E.2d

79, 84-85 (W. Va. 1991), overruled in Courtney v. Courtney, 437 S.E.2d 436 (W.
Va. 1993) (holding that the statute of limitations should have been two years).
84. Id. at 81 (holding that exposing a mortician to physical contact with an
AIDS infected corpse without his knowledge or consent was not an "offensive
touching" sufficient to support a claim of battery).
85. For example, a lawsuit filed in Tennessee by John Jarvis claimed $1
million against the LeBonheur Children's Medical Center and Dr. Landon B.
Pendergrass for not disclosing that a child whose body they gave him for burial
in 1991 had died of complications related to AIDS. AIDS CASEBOOK, supra note
32, at 71 (Supp. 1992) (quotingTHE ADVOCATE, Mar. 10, 1992, at 23); Civil Lawsuit Filed by Mortician Charges HospitalNon-Disclosure,AIDS PoL'Y & L. Mar.

5, 1992, at 4.
86. 835 F. Supp. 796 (D. N.J. 1993).
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dismissed a man's claims of intentional exposure and intentional
infliction of emotional distress against his former lover who concealed the fact that he had HIV. Although a period of intense anxiety might be expected after learning of a potential exposure to HIV,
the court found that intense anxiety is not enough to sustain a
87
cause of action in the absence of actual HIV transmission.
Funeral home directors, facing a burden of proof similar to that
in J.B. v. Bohonovsky, would likewise fail in actions where there is
nothing more than anxiety from not being told that a person died of
causes related to HIV. Furthermore, because of the mandate to use
universal precautions in all instances, there is less likelihood that a
funeral home director could recover for a hospital's failure to provide notice that a person died of causes related to HIV.
B. Death Certificatesand Death Notices
All deaths in the United States are reported on medical certificates which list the cause of death. Two major categories of privacy
questions arise in connection with death certificates and death notices. An initial category of questions exists as to whether death
certificates and death notices should list AIDS or HIV as a cause of
death. '"Since people do not die of AIDS itself, but rather from one
of the opportunistic diseases that can more freely invade the body of
a person whose immune system is depressed, both death certificates and obituaries can readily be written without any reference to
AIDS."8 8 Many death certificates and death notices avoid references to AIDS by reporting the cause of death as pneumonia, cancer, or some other general cause.8 9 This is often true with the
obituaries for prominent people, especially when their names are
linked to commercial enterprises. 90 Obituaries also avoid reference
to AIDS to circumvent the "surviving spouse syndrome" which may
attach to surviving life partners of those who die of illnesses related
to HIV:
Because there has been so much hysteria and unwarranted discrimination associated with AIDS, even the preparation of death certificates
and obituaries has been a cause of concern for both the surviving family and friends of the decedent. If the death certificate or obituary
identifies the cause of death as complications from AIDS, family and
friends of the decedent may well suffer from their association with the
87. Id.; see also 'Severe Emotional Distress' Ruled Necessary for HJV Case
Recovery, AIDS POL'Y & L. Nov. 26, 1993, at 2 (discussing requirement of severe

emotional distress in cases where plaintiff seeks to recover from estate of for-

mer lover who did not inform that he had AIDS); Embalmers Said Unlikely to
Get HIV During Procedures,AIDS POL'Y & L. Oct. 4, 1989, at 10-11 (describing
low risk of occupational exposure to HIV).
88. AIDS LAw, supra note 7, at 128.
89. Id. at 127-28.
90. See, e.g., AIDS CASEBOOK, supra note 32, at 500-01 (obituary of Perry
Ellis).
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decedent. Other people may assume that the family and friends have
AIDS or are at increased risk for AIDS. 9 1
The question about whether AIDS is listed as a contributing
cause of death is of special concern to some funeral directors and
embalmers, who may rely on the document to determine whether to
use the universal precautions to avoid contract HIV. Funeral directors may in fact rely upon the death certificate as an alternative to
oral communication from a hospital that a person died of an illness
related to HIV. The expectation that HIV or AIDS will appear on
the death certificate relates to the perceived right of funeral home
directors and embalmers to know in all possible instances that a
certain person died of an illness related to HIV.
As with instances of oral communications that a person died of
an illness related to HIV, funeral directors and embalmers should
not rely upon the death certificate to decide whether to use universal precautions. The universal precautions should be used universally, even though they may be uncomfortable for some funeral
home employees or embalmers. Death certificates should not be
relied upon as a source to learn that a person died of AIDS. There
is great variation in the preparation of death certificates because of
stigma and discrimination and because of the nature of HIV disease
and the resulting opportunistic infections.
Other questions arise as to whether the public has a general
right of access to death certificates that list HIV or AIDS as a contributing cause of death. Some state statutes make death certificates public records, and some courts have found that
confidentiality laws do not extend to death certificates. 9 2 In TriState PublishingCo. v. City of PortJervis,93 for example, a newspaper was able to obtain a copy of a death certificate from a hospital
patient who was believed to have died from causes related to HIV.
Although state statues mandated privacy disclosure for HIV testing
results, the court found that the death certificate was not privileged
under state law nor exempt from access for privacy considerations.
Courts have not always ordered disclosure, however. In Flynn v.
Doe,9 4 for example, the court granted anonymity in perpetuity and
sealed a death certificate that stipulated that AIDS was the cause
91. AIDS LAw, supra note 7, at 127-28. See also Snipes v. Mack, 381 S.E.2d
318 (Ga. Ct. App. 1989) (woman libeled by former boyfriend who erected signs
falsely stating that she had AIDS); McCune v. Neitzel, 457 N.W.2d 803 (Neb.

1990) (plaintiff sued defendant for slander for a rumor that he had AIDS); William Robbins, A Rumor of AIDS, a Slander Award, N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 1990,
at A8 (discussing McCune).
92. AIDS LAw, supra note 7, at 277 (discussing state policy toward making
death certificates public records); see also Death CertificatesRuled Exception To
Texas Ban on Test Result Release, AIDS POL'Y & L. Dec. 12, 1991, at 6 (discussing Texas Attorney General Opinion No. DM-61).

93. 523 N.Y.S.2d 954 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1988).
94. 553 N.Y.S.2d 288 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1990).
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of death. 95
This schism in court cases has lead some jurisdictions to adopt
specific rules concerning the question of whether HIV or AIDS may
be disclosed on a death certificate, given that members of the public
may obtain copies of the death certificate. In Chicago, Illinois, for
example, the cause of death is blocked out from copies of the death
certificate if the cause of death is described as AIDS, HIV-disease,
or an illness commonly associated with HIV-disease. Funeral directors, who are given copies of death certificates with blocked out
boxes, report that they reasonably suspect that the person died of
an illness related to HIV, because the black box on the death certificate is used only in cases where a person had AIDS. Members of
the public, without similar experience, have not yet made this connection, although this may change as the blacked-out certificates
appear more often.
Funeral directors are also involved in the writing of death notices for publication. They usually collect relevant information
from the traditional or non-traditional family and draft the death
notices. Newspapers generally respect family wishes and print
96
solely the cause of death as announced.
Some families may wish to avoid any mention of AIDS to avoid
the surviving spouse syndrome or to maintain the privacy of the
person who died. To satisfy the concerns of these families, the funeral director may want to type out a draft of the death notice and
show it to the family. This practice will subtly assure the family
that AIDS will not be listed as a cause of death.
Other families, especially non-traditional families, may want
the death notice or obituary to identify AIDS as the cause of death.
AIDS often appears in obituaries where the person was an AIDS
activist or where the surviving life partner has HIV. AIDS appears
in these obituaries to document the toll of this plague upon our
country, and to educate those who continue to wallow in complacency and denial in the face of tragedy. Some weekly newspapers
for the gay and lesbian community now carry obituaries that mention at least one AIDS death in almost every issue. Major daily
newspapers now regularly carry obituaries that mention AIDS as
the cause of death.
Another issue that still sometimes arises is when a newspaper
refuses to carry a death notice that identifies the surviving life
partner of a gay man or lesbian. In the early years of the epidemic,
mainstream newspapers premised their refusals to print the names
95. The holding in Flynn is criticized in Doe v. New York, 579 N.Y.S.2d 822,
823-24 (N.Y. Ct. Cl. 1991).
96.

AIDS CASEBOOK, supra note 32, at 500 (finding that newspapers tend to

respect family wishes as regards obituaries).
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of the life partners or "long time companions" on the basis that
"such persons had no legitimate relationship to the deceased." 9 7
Pressure from gay activists brought a change in the refusals to publish names of surviving partners; it is now common for major daily
newspapers to publish the names of life partners when that information is submitted for publication.9"

D. Rental Caskets
Because only an unfinished wooden box is required for direct
cremation, 9 9 a small number of funeral homes offer families the opportunity to rent more elaborate caskets for viewing. Questions
have arisen as to whether a funeral home must disclose to potential
renters that a previous user of the rental casket died of causes related to HIV. Arguments that there is a duty to disclose that a
person died of causes related to AIDS may be based on decisions
setting aside real estate transactions where a buyer was not informed about a fact that "psychologically impacted" the real estate. 10 0 Funeral home directors have speculated that they may be
liable to the manufacturer of the casket if they do not disclose the
cause of death.
There are at least five reasons why there should be no liability
for failing to disclose that a rental casket had been used for a person who died of complications related to HIV. First, the rental casket will be cleaned between uses. Second, families using rental
caskets will also necessarily understand that others have used the
casket. Third, there is no danger that the body to be placed in the
97. AIDS

CASEBOOK,

supra note 32, at 501.

98. See id.
99. See 16 C.F.R. § 453.4(a)(1) (1993) ("In selling or offering to sell funeral
goods or funeral services to the public, it is an unfair or deceptive act or practice

for a funeral provider, or a crematory, to require that a casket other than an

unfinished wood box be purchased for direct cremation.").
100. See, e.g., Reed v. King, 193 Cal. Rptr. 130 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983) (broker
did not disclose that a house was a murder site); Stambovsky v. Ackley, 572
N.Y.S.2d 672 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991) (buyer was not informed that the house was
represented to be a haunted house): Van Camp v. Bradford, 623 N.E.2d 731 (Ct.
C.P. Ohio 1993) (failure to disclose previous rapes at the property).
These real estate cases should not mandate disclosure that a previous
home owner had HIV or died or causes related to AIDS, and much less so to
rental caskets used on persons who have died of causes related to AIDS. Professor Warner observes that: "Even though AIDS may affect property values, the
law refuses to accept AIDS-based real estate evaluation. These negative evaluations are deemed invalid, not because they are not real to the buyer, but because they are irrational and harmful to society. Psychologically impacted real
estate evaluation is irrational and harmful, and it should be legally unacceptable." Daniel M. Warner, Caveat Spiritus: A JurisprudentialReflection Upon
the Law of HauntedHouses and Ghosts, 28 VAL. U. L. REV. 207, 240 (1993) (also
praising legislative responses against court rulings that have allowed cases for
not disclosing psychological facts about real estate). See also John H. Scheid,
Jr., Note, MandatoryDisclosure Law: A Statute for Illinois, 27 J. MARSHALL L.
REV. 155 (1993).
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rental casket could contract HIV from the previous body. Fourth,
informing others that a previous body had HIV may violate state
HIV confidentiality or privacy protections for the deceased person
or members of the family. Fifth and finally, informing others only
in the context of HIV may be construed as an act of discrimination
in the provision of public accommodations.
Funeral homes would also violate the ADA if they refused to
allow a person who died of causes related to HIV to use a rental
casket if rental caskets are allowed for others. 10 1 It may also violate the ADA to have a separate rental casket used only for persons
who die of causes related to HIV.10 2 In sum, if a funeral home offers rental caskets, it should do so on equal terms and without regard to the cause of death.
CONCLUSION

Several conclusions can thus be drawn to advise funeral directors of their legal obligations regarding access to funeral services
and how to avoid discrimination. First, because it is unlawful to
discriminate against persons with HIV, and because funeral services are places of public accommodation, it is unlawful to refuse to
handle the body of a person who dies of an illness related to HIV.
Funeral homes that charge more to handle a person who died of
HIV will violate the human rights laws and, in some jurisdictions,
specific statutes that make it illegal to charge more to embalm the
remains of a person with a communicable disease.
Second, as the number of deaths related to HIV continues to
increase, all funeral homes must educate their employees as to
proper infection control procedures and must also ensure that appropriate protective measures are available to comply with the universal precautions. It should not be a future defense to a charge of
discrimination that the funeral home simply did not know how to
handle a person who died of an illness related to HIV. It should
also not be a defense that other funeral homes may be better suited,
101. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(ii) (1993) ("It shall be discriminatory to afford an individual or class of individuals, on the basis of a disability or disabilities of such individual or class, directly, or through contractual, licensing, or
other arrangements, with the opportunity to participate in or benefit from a
good, service, facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation that is not equal
to that afforded to other individuals.").
102. Id. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(iii) ("It shall be discriminatory to afford an individual or class of individuals, on the basis of a disability or disabilities of such

individual or class, directly, or through contractual, licensing, or other arrangements, with the opportunity to participate in or benefit from a good, service,
facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation that is different or separate
from that provided to other individuals, unless such action is necessary to pro-

vide the individual or class of individuals with a good, service, facility, privilege,

advantage, or accommodation, or other opportunity that is as effective as that
provided to others.").
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or have more experience, in providing services to persons who die of
illnesses related to HIV.
Third, the appropriate protective gear should also be made
available to all embalmers called to work at the funeral home,
whether or not the funeral home considers the embalmer to be an
independent contractor. If the funeral home provides the work
space and work materials for an embalmer working as an independent contractor, the funeral home may still face lawsuits for failing
to provide appropriate materials.
Fourth, it is discriminatory to suggest to families that a person
who died of an illness related to HIV must be cremated or that the
memorial service must be held with a closed casket by reason of
decedent's cause of death. 10 3 Thousands of funerals across the
country (and in other countries) have proven that the full range of
options should be offered to the families. Fifth, it is likewise discriminatory to charge more simply because a person died of an illness related to HIV. The universal precautions to be used in all
instances should not be used only when a funeral home director
knows (or suspects) that a person died of an illness related to HIV.
In sum, funeral home directors must provide a full range of services
to persons who die of illnesses related to HIV, they must unilaterally implement the universal precautions to safeguard themselves
and their employees in all instances, and they cannot discriminate
in the services offered or the fees charged when a person dies of an
illness related to HIV.

103. Exceptions may arise when the closed casket is recommended for religious reasons or when there is no tradition in the family or community of open
casket ceremonies.

